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From the earliest days of the modern U.S.-Korea alliance,
there have been tensions reflected by debates in the Ameri-
can policy community over how to deal with North Korea.
Under the Clinton and Bush presidencies respectively, U.S.
policy toward North Korea has fluctuated wildly, from inten-
sive engagement and deal-making to confrontation, coercion,
and containment.  There have been less noticed but equally
important fluctuations in policy toward South Korea.  These
policy changes did not always correspond to developments in
Korea, but sometimes reflected U.S. ideological and political
battles.
The following analysis of recent developments in U.S. policy
toward the Korean peninsula is based on six surveys sent to
over 220 American specialists on Korea, Northeast Asia and
nonproliferation across the country in March, April and Feb-
ruary of 2007; July and September of 2008; and May 2009.
The response rate was 10 to 20 percent, or between 25 and 50
respondents per survey.
Based on the two most recent surveys conducted in May, the
majority view among respondents is that the North's missile
and nuclear tests in April and May 2009 constitute a clear re-
jection of diplomacy with the United States.  Very few believe
there is much reason to continue to try to revive the deals
based on the September 2005 Joint Statement.  Following
the two tests, the dominant themes of public comment by
American analysts have emphasized the need to present a
united front among the U.S., Japan and South Korea, and the
need to bring China and Russia into a more punishing regime
of UN sanctions and other actions.  So far, this consensus has
held to an unusual degree, stemming from the shock of North
Korea's quick actions and extremely provocative statements.
Even if North Korea soon launches another short range mis-
sile or ICBM, specialist opinion will likely continue to stress
sanctions and punishments.
At the same time, many respondents expect that both South
Korea and the U.S. will exert maximum energy to revive en-
gagement.  In response to the question "How should the
Obama administration react to the (missile and nuclear)
tests?" 44 percent chose "Carefully coordinate a tough policy
response among U.S. allies, Six Party partners and UNSC
members."  However, 39 percent of respondents thought the
United States should "Intensify and raise the level of bilateral
U.S.-DPRK contacts in order to break the cycle of escalation."
Other options included "Insist that the DPRK use the Six
Party framework for discussion of its main interests and de-
mands" and "Enhance military readiness together with South
Korea as a signal and symbol of determination."  
When asked "What is the best course of action for the South
Korean government to take in the wake of the missile and nu-
clear tests?" 61 percent of respondents chose "React calmly,
placing more emphasis and effort on the offer of direct dia-
logue with the North," while 56 percent chose "Pressure
North Korea with a coordinated stance among the U.S.,
Japan and South Korea, possibly including sanctions."  A key
policy question that emerges from these views is whether
both approaches can be pursued at the same time.  
AUGUST 2009 - VOL 1, NO. 7
THE MISSING CONSENSUS: 
U.S. SPECIALIST VIEWS ON KOREA
Prior to North Korea’s nuclear and missile  tests, the Obama
administration's management of the U.S.-ROK alliance as of
May 2009 received support similar to the Bush administra-
tion (from a September 2008 survey) of aggregate support for
"yes" and "mostly effective:" 64 percent for Obama versus 65
percent for Bush.  Survey respondents have steadily judged
the most important issues in the U.S.-ROK alliance to be the
need for progress on the North Korean nuclear issue, closely
followed by the KORUS FTA and the need to plan for North
Korean contingencies and military cooperation.
2009 Priorities for U.S.-ROK Attention: Survey Results
Source: ProGlobal Surveys, September 2008 and May 2009.
Two Opposing Camps
At least as far back as 1994, two views of the North Korea
problem have competed, sometimes heatedly, for policy pre-
eminence.  Ironically, each camp views the embrace by the
U.S. administration of the opponent's policy prescription—
bold engagement or enhanced sanctions and containment—as
a sign that denuclearization has been abandoned in favor of
counter-proliferation.  Early in the Bush administration, Sec-
retary of State Colin Powell provoked this fear among some
observers when he said on a Sunday news show that the num-
ber of nuclear weapons produced by the DPRK was less im-
portant than our commitment to contain them.  
The Obama administration's recent support of Bill Clinton's
humanitarian mission to free two U.S. journalists provoked
this response from The Heritage Foundation's Bruce
Klingner:  "U.S. allies South Korea and Japan remain exceed-
ingly nervous that Obama will eventually abandon the U.S.
policy of denuclearizing North Korea and accept a lower stan-
dard of merely preventing future nuclear proliferation (“Bill
Clinton in Pyongyang: Bring American Reporters Home, Do
Not Let Up on Nukes,” Webmemo #2573, August 4, 2009,
The Heritage Foundation).”  In the January-February edition
of Arms Control Today, Joel Wit urges bolder engagement,
noting that although the political and bureaucratic difficulties
of the current situation may argue for "adopting a warmed-
over Bush approach of seeking very small steps forward" so as
to limit exposure and risk, doing so "runs the serious risk of
allowing Pyongyang to think that its strategy of playing for
time can succeed...It also encourages the dangerous misper-
ception among U.S. allies that Washington will indeed be will-
ing to live with a nuclear North Korea (“Dealing With North
Korea: "Diplomatic Warfare" Ahead,” Arms Control Today,
January-February 2009).”  
Two views of the history of U.S.-North Korean negotiations
continue to divide the U.S. policy community.  One view holds
that there are good reasons to expect the DPRK to sell off even
its nascent nuclear threat if the U.S. makes a consistent and
credible commitment to the North's development, diplomatic
engagement and long-term security.  The other view is that
the evidence is now conclusive that the North Korean leader-
ship cares more about its nuclear capability and isolation
from foreign influence than about economic development or
diplomacy-based security.  This continues to be the majority
view, as it has been for most of the past 15 years.  
A parallel debate involves the political cost of working for a
comprehensive denuclearization deal as opposed to enhanced
containment and more punishing sanctions.  A divide among
nonproliferation specialists has clearly emerged over the past
four months, as tension and escalation have again defined the
U.S.-DPRK relationship.  Some favor a strong and multdi-
mensional approach, while others are convinced North Korea
will be a test case for containment in the next phase of non-
proliferation strategy.  The growing issue of containment ver-
sus disarmament will be a major factor influencing the future
direction of U.S. policy toward North Korea in coming months
as the Obama administration makes critical decisions on how
to proceed.  
Most - Least Important
RANK 1 2 3 4 5
MAY 2009
U.S.-ROK Joint Declaration 11% 14% 22% 17% 36%
Miilitary cooperation 8% 8% 28% 31% 25%
DPRK contingency planning 17% 17% 28% 20% 19%
DPRK nuclear issue 42% 36% 6% 8% 8%
KORUS FTA 24% 24% 19% 24% 8%
SEPTEMBER 2008
NE Asia security community 0% 10% 14% 24% 52%
Military cooperation 0% 0% 29% 29% 43%
DPRK contingency planning 19% 43% 24% 14% 0%
DPRK nuclear issue 76% 10% 5% 10% 0%
KORUS FTA 5% 35% 30% 25% 5%
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NEWS & EVENTS
SEPTEMBER 24-25, 2009 – KRIHS, ANYANG, KOREA
INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON THE ROLE AND
VISION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND INTE-
GRATED DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
The Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements
(KRIHS) will hold a workshop at its anyang office in
Korea on international development strategies toward
the peninsula.  Cent er for U.S.-Korea Policy Director
Scott Snyder will present a paper on U.S. strategies to-
ward Korea and Northeast Asia.
AUGUST 17-21, 2009 – KGF, SEOUL, KOREA
10th WORLD KOREAN FORUM
The Korean Global Foundation will hold its “World Ko-
rean Forum,” an annual international forum that ex-
plores Korean peninsula issues.  Scott Snyder will speak
on the foreign policy of the Obama administration and
Northeast Asia.  Details of this year’s 10th anniversary
event “The New Era of Unified Korea & World” are
available at: www.koreanglobalfoundation.org.  
AUGUST 13-14, 2009 – NAVAL POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL, COLORADO SPRINGS, CO
SECURITY ASSURANCES WORKSHOP
This workshop aims to assess the effectiveness of secu-
rity assurances and identify conditions for their suc-
cess, drawing from broad theoretical and historical
perspectives and region-specific case studies.  Scott
Snyder will address the role of security assurances in
the South Korean case.
AUGUST 4, 2009 – CFR.ORG INTERVIEW
PYONGYANG’S PARDONS
Scott Snyder was interviewed by CFR.org’s Bernard Gw-
ertzman on former President Bill Clinton’s recent visit
to North Korea and the release of two U.S. journalists,
and the broader implications for U.S.-DPRK relations.
The complete transcript is available at: www.cfr.org. 
PUBLICATIONS
Scott Snyder (August 5, 2009), “Clinton to Pyongyang: After
Action Assessment,” GlobalSecurity.org.
Scott Snyder (August 4, 2009), “Clinton to Pyongyang: Crite-
ria for Success,” GlobalSecurity.org.
Scott Snyder (July 22, 2009), “North Korea’s Left Turn: Im-
plications for Regime Stability,” GlobalSecurity.org.
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun (July  2009), “Pyongyang
Tests Beijing’s Patience,”  in Brad Glosserman and Carl Baker,
eds., Comparative Connections 11-2, Pacific Forum CSIS.
Scott Snyder (July 9, 2009), “What if North Korea Says No?:
Medium- to-Long Term Strategic Options,”
GlobalSecurity.org.
Scott Snyder (July 3, 2009), "What's Driving Pyongyang?"
GlobalSecurity.org.  This article originally appeared in the
July 2009 issue of The Oriental Economist. 
For a complete list of publications, please visit: 
www.centerforuskoreapolicy.org.
VIEWS ON THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE
“The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which is beneficial to
both of our economies with its geopolitical significance for the
Northeast Asian region, will be the cornerstone of strength-
ened partnership and friendship in the future.”
--Ambassador Han Duck-soo, ROK ambassador to the
U.S., on Capitol Hill, July 29, 2009.
“The United States’ Korean armistice day is a clear display of
their wide support for and interest in the Korea-U.S. alliance.”
--President Lee Myung-bak on the Korean War Veterans
Recognition Act, July 29, 2009.
“The South Korean government, working with the private sec-
tor and civil society, was able to create a set of institutions
that provided transparency and accountability and efficiency
that allowed for extraordinary economic progress.”
--President Barack Obama at a press conference,
L’Aquila, Italy, July 10, 2009.
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The Center for U.S.-Korea Policy aims to deepen and
broaden the foundations for institutionalized cooperation
between the United States and South Korea by promot-
ing a comprehensive U.S.-ROK alliance partnership on
emerging global, regional, and nontraditional security
challenges.  A project of The Asia Foundation, the Cen-
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